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Reference: 24/DACSO/2019/RW

By email

18th February 2019

Dear HH Judge Lucraft QC,

I write on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in response to your Regulation 28 Report to prevent future deaths dated 19th December 2018. This followed the conclusion of the inquests into the circumstances of the deaths of Kurt Cochran, Leslie Rhodes, Aysha Frade, Andreea Cristea, PC Keith Palmer and the attacker Khalid Masood on 22 March 2017.

The Coroner's report to prevent future deaths has been read and considered by the Commissioner and at the highest level within the PaDP command. It will also be disseminated and discussed widely with officers on the command.

In this letter I will address the specific recommendations within the report. This response should be read alongside the representations made by the MPS in advance of the report being issued. A copy of the MPS' submission is attached to this letter.

Recommendations:

MC1: I suggest that the MPS gives consideration to providing revised Post Instructions to relevant groups by direct emails, in hard copy and/or via electronic devices (as well as their being accessible through ADAM) and to providing them in a way that requires the recipient to respond indicating safe receipt.

1. ADAM is an IT system, with limited storage space and there are therefore restrictions on the volume of data that can be put on it. ADAM is a comparatively slow system and it can be difficult for officers to quickly log in and check for updates. Furthermore, the set-up of the ADAM system presents difficulties for an effective audit of some functions. Whilst space has now been cleared to improve the audit function, it is accepted that the data provided does not easily enable analysis.
2. The Commissioner accepted at the inquests that there were deficiencies with the ADAM system and in particular that there was too great a reliance upon ADAM which at the time was the primary means of communicating changes to post instructions.
3. Following the inquests, a great deal of work has been carried out within PaDP in relation to the ADAM system, post instructions and auditing compliance. A temporary system has been introduced whereby officers sign a form before they take over a post to say that they have read the post instructions and are aware of their role. This must be completed before an officer can sign out a firearm. Changes to post instructions are now emailed directly to all officers on PaDP, not just supervisors (see para 7 below). Further improvements will be made following the introduction of a digital system currently on trial called AIRBOX (see para 6 below). All Sergeants and Inspectors have been briefed on their operational responsibilities for supervision of officers on posts. Supervisors are set performance targets for post knowledge checks on every shift.
4. As stated above, the MPS is currently procuring a system to replace ADAM and a trial of a new system called AIRBOX will begin in February 2019. This system will not only be able to store post instructions but is also capable of allowing the command (i.e. supervisory officers within PaDP) to view the location of every officer, to identify any officer who is not on post and any officer who is on a post and ought not to be. It is a system which is already being used by other forces nationally, by counter terrorism specialist firearms officers (CTSFOs) nationally, and is soon to be rolled out in the MPS within the Firearms Command (MO19). Should this system be adopted in PaDP, all officers will be issued with a mobile data device to view and use AIRBOX. The finance to procure and purchase devices has already been approved in advance of the trial.
5. As the Chief Coroner notes, whenever post instructions are updated, all AFOs on the command are now emailed directly informing them of this and a voting button is attached to the email for an officer to confirm that they have read the email and will log into ADAM to read the revised post instruction(s). The voting response forms part of a compliance audit. Previously, notifications were routinely sent to supervisors for briefing purposes. Officers are now required to log in to MPS information systems on a monthly basis. Supervisors monitor

whether emails have been read. This is audited where an email relates to an update to post instructions.

6. Supervision and knowledge checks are carried out on posts by all supervisors on a daily basis. A minimum of five checks each shift for armed and unarmed officers are completed, which amounts to a minimum of 20 checks each day. Since the new system was implemented in October 2018, 2643 checks have been completed. This represents an 86% increase since the introduction of new processes and the results of these checks are shared with the senior leadership team (SLT) in a fortnightly report and discussed at the SLT meeting. The data forms part of monthly, quarterly and annual performance reports for the command. The data is broken down and shared with supervisors and teams. It is used to identify any key learning themes and these are then disseminated and addressed within the command.
7. As the MPS stated at Annex 1, all post instructions are now available to officers in hard copy form at every post location on the POW estate and at every diplomatic post location where suitable storage is available. These are also available in hard copy in the Sergeant's office at the Palace of Westminster and in every base room in PaDP buildings (Apex House, Lillie Road base, Kensington base). Previously, hard copies of the post instructions were only available in the mess and armouries at Palace of Westminster.
8. It is not possible to provide individual hard copies of post instructions to all officers due to the security sensitivity of these documents. There are also restrictions upon emailing such documents to large groups. The MPS has introduced the procedure detailed above as a means of ensuring compliance without compromising security.
9. PaDP has developed an Innovation and Development Team (IDT) who are responsible for compliance, audit and governance. This reports to and provides a performance pack for the PaDP senior leadership team. This (initially temporary) team is currently one Sergeant and 12 constables. Agreement has been made for a permanent team comprising two Sergeants and seven full time PCs.
10. A knowledge management manual has been produced online and the link shared with all officers. Officers are also sent the relevant sections of the knowledge manual in advance of the scheduled knowledge management checks conducted by supervisors, so that they are able to familiarise themselves with the area about to be checked. An annual audit schedule is in place, which enables oversight of all themes over a 12 month period. Each audit takes place over periods of 14 to 21 days. It is planned that this manual will be stored on a system which will enable the MPS to monitor which officers have logged into the manual, at what time and for how long. This will be audited by the IDT. The command is looking for a suitable

system to provide this data as it must be compliant with the requisite security levels. These improved procedures are already in place. The timeframe for the improved IT system is addressed elsewhere in this response.

MC2: I suggest that the MPS considers making it mandatory for officers on the Command to register for ADAM and to access it at specified intervals (perhaps supplemented by an instruction to confirm review of material on the system).

11. Registration on ADAM was mandatory at the time of the attacks. The Commissioner accepts that the inquests revealed that an unacceptable number of officers had not registered at the time of the attack and that the number of officers who had accessed ADAM in the months before the attack was also unacceptable.
12. Compliance has substantially improved and the proportion of officers on the PaDP command who have now registered on ADAM is 100%. This is a mandatory element of the induction course into the command which takes place in the first week of joining PaDP. This sets the tone around knowledge requirements when officers arrive at PaDP. For existing officers, separate instructions have been issued around registering and logging into the ADAM system regularly. In addition, there is a separate regime of supervision checks conducted on posts to check that officers are aware of the post instructions and complying with them. These checks are recorded, analysed and produced in a performance report by the IDT. In addition, PaDP has developed a 'Skills Loss Policy' to enable officers to be exited from the Command where there is a loss of confidence due to a failure to comply with instructions. There has been a significant amount of work in the background to clear enough space on the ADAM server to be able to enable the audit functionality. This is now complete and the audit functionality is live.
13. The recommendation in MC2 will be communicated to all PaDP supervisors and the Professional Standards Unit to ensure that this improvement continues and that steps are taken in the event of non-compliance. There are already formal sanctions in place through the Unsatisfactory Performance Procedure (UPP) and Misconduct regulations. In addition, please see Para 12 above regarding the skills loss policy which will be instigated following UPP or misconduct proceedings. The "Skills Loss Policy" will be in place within one calendar month.

MC3: Given the figures for usage of the ADAM System, it is a matter of concern whether officers have (a) adequate time to access the System regularly and review their Post Instructions and (b) adequate facilities to do so (e.g. ready access to computer terminals). I therefore suggest that the MPS considers the time and facilities available for officers to access the ADAM System and review their instructions.

14. As a result of matters which came to light at the inquest, the briefings for AFOs at the POW have changed. A bespoke briefing is mandatory whenever there has been an update to post instructions. This is auditable through the METBATS system which is the system used by the MPS to brief officers.
15. AFOs have periods of standby time between posts of at least one hour, but this can be two hours or more. Officers are aware of their postings three weeks in advance and this time must be used to refresh and improve familiarity with post instructions. All officers are reminded of the need to refresh their knowledge when they come on duty and sign to accept their postings for the day. An agenda item will be raised at the next challenge meeting on 01.03.19 as to whether this time is sufficient. This has also been raised with supervisors on the PaDP command.
16. As set out above, all officers must now sign a declaration before commencing duty confirming that they have read and understood their post instructions. Officers are not permitted to commence post duties or sign out a firearm without signing the declaration. Auditing of this requirement has shown a 100% compliance rate.
17. As stated above, a bespoke IT solution is being developed for the command as a priority. It is anticipated that this will include the use of hand held devices upon which post instructions can be viewed.
18. Work to upgrade the network at POW is ongoing and has been delayed due to cabling and heritage issues at the POW. There are already 30 terminals currently available across PaDP and following the upgrade and completion of works, there will be over 40 terminals available to officers across 4 sites, 24 hours a day. More terminals are available overnight and at weekends when office based staff are off duty. Additionally, 140 officers have personal issue mobile tablet devices and there are docking stations at the Lillie Road base and at Charing Cross police station.

MC4: I suggest that the MPS considers a periodic audit of all extant Post Instructions for the Parliamentary Estate to ensure their consistency and fitness for purpose. This might be part of the supervisory audit discussed at MC7 below, or separate from it.

19. It is accepted that different opinions were expressed at the inquests as to whether post instructions were “open to interpretation” or not. To the extent that there was uncertainty and a lack of precision in the wording of a small number of post instructions relating for example to phrases such as “short patrol”, this has been addressed and such wording is no longer used.
20. The increased and improved communication between AFOs, supervisors and tactical advisors (as detailed in these submissions) is also used as a means of ensuring understanding and compliance with post instructions.
21. A review of post instructions is currently taking place with the inclusion of the Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) and the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ) to ensure that there is no ambiguity in post instructions. This has already resulted in the creation of orders and instructions which have been separated from the specific post instructions. This will be further reviewed by MPS senior managers and lawyers who were present at the inquests, who will be able to assist in light of matters which emerged in evidence and to ensure that the Chief Coroner’s recommendation is fully addressed. It is expected that this will take three months to implement.
22. A new post has also been created at PaDP for a Sergeant with responsibility for reviewing posts and post instructions. The skills criteria for this role include the requirement to be an Operational Firearms Commander (OFC) with the ability to provide day to day tactical advice on posts. This post reports to the Inspector with responsibility for operations and post instructions. This post has been created, ratified and advertised internally. A Sergeant has been selected and is in the post with support pending his OFC Course scheduled for May 2019.

MC5: It was a matter of concern that, at the time of the attack, one of the most vulnerable and public entrances to the Parliamentary Estate was not protected by armed police. In my view, the MPS should consider (a) imposing a standing order that there should be armed officers stationed at all open public entry points to the Palace of Westminster (and possibly to some other buildings on the Parliamentary Estate) and (b) introducing a provision that this standing order may only be varied with the written approval of an officer of very senior rank.

23. At the time of Masood's attack, Carriage Gates should have been protected by two AFOs in accordance with the post instructions. Steps have since been taken to ensure that this entrance has a static armed post (two AFOs) at the gates and the gates are always protected by at least this number of armed officers during sitting hours. This was introduced as a result of a new tactical assessment which was conducted immediately after the attacks. The Chief Coroner will also be aware of what he observed on the site visit and the Sir Jon Murphy report.
24. Carriage Gates presents unique challenges for the police in providing protection and security. The balance between the democratic symbolism of an open Parliament and the need to protect those who work and visit the estate has been reviewed after the attack. It remains the commitment of both the MPS and the Parliamentary authorities to ensure that terrorists do not change our way of life or the operation of Parliament which remains open to the public. The Chief Coroner's observations in this regard are respectfully endorsed. As the Chief Coroner will be aware, this is an area upon which the MPS requires the consent of the Parliamentary Authorities.
25. The MPS does not have a relevant system of "standing orders" which could precisely and effectively deliver that which the Chief Coroner has recommended. However, the Commissioner recognises and accepts the rationale behind recommendation MC5.
26. The present armed policing model ensures that all open public entrances to the Parliamentary Estate are protected by armed guards when Parliament is sitting.
27. The Commissioner can confirm that in the unlikely event that tactical advice were received and accepted which recommended that a public entrance would not be protected by armed guards during sitting hours then this would require the authority of an officer of at least the rank of Chief Superintendent before implementation. At present this would be the PaDP Commander. To the extent that this requires action it will be implemented immediately.

MC6: It was a matter of concern that officers were unaware of their Post Instructions and that supervisory systems had not identified limited usage of the ADAM System. I therefore suggest that the MPS considers auditing use of the ADAM System periodically, by checks to confirm use at sufficiently regular intervals over the period.

28. This is noted. The Commissioner respectfully submits that the answers to MC1 and MC2 above deal with this recommendation. ADAM registration and usage will continue to be regularly audited and supervision and knowledge checks by supervisors will continue on a daily basis until such time as a new system is commissioned and delivered.

MC7: I suggest that the MPS considers instituting regular supervisory audits of policing at the Palace of Westminster (and perhaps other parts of the Parliamentary Estate), preferably by officers outside the PaDP Command.

29. As the MPS explained in the Regulation 28 submission, supervision of armed officers at the Palace of Westminster has been substantially improved. This has taken the form of increased training for AFOs and supervisors and a significant increase in the number of checks of AFOs by supervisors with clearly auditable records kept and monitored by senior management.

30. The review of risk assessments for posts is conducted by a Tactical Advisor from MO19. As explained in the response to MC4 above, an additional OFC Sergeant post has been created within the PaDP command to review posts on an ongoing basis in addition to the tactical advice received from MO19.

31. The recommendation for an external (non PaDP) audit is noted. The MPS will introduce a system which will require a supervisory audit to be completed at least bi-annually by officers who are not part of the PaDP command on a trial basis. The first external audit will take place in the summer of 2019, by which time the review of post instructions will have been completed and any revisions implemented.

MC8: I suggest that the MPS, with the Parliamentary Authorities, reviews the adequacy of training to ensure that it involves AFOs, unarmed officers and security officers and their co-ordination.

32. All armed and unarmed officers on the PaDP command undergo joint officer safety training and emergency life support training every year.
33. The MPS currently provides joint training involving AFOs, unarmed officers and security officers. There is an extensive joint training, testing and exercising programme with Parliament. This includes monthly table-top operations. This programme commenced in April 2018. Plans are in place to undertake a significant live testing exercise this year. These exercises include armed and unarmed officers at all ranks and Palace Security.
34. The PaDP command has created two new roles for specialist Firearms Instructors who will form part of the command. The instructors will advise and assist in the training of all officers, armed and unarmed, and any training which is negotiated with Parliament to include, in light of the Chief Coroner's recommendations, security officers. Finance has been agreed for these posts which will be advertised imminently. It is anticipated that due to the recruitment, selection and workforce planning process it will take approximately three months for these officers to be in post.
35. All unarmed supervisors on the PaDP command have observed tactical refresher training for armed officers at the MPS firearms training facility at Milton and this will form part of the induction to the command for unarmed supervisors going forward. The inclusion of all unarmed officers, at all ranks, will now be factored into ongoing training.
36. Joint training with security officers will require assistance from the Parliamentary authorities, who we are in discussion with. The MPS will negotiate with the Parliamentary authorities to ensure that this recommendation is implemented. There are joint exercises scheduled for March and July 2019.

MC9: I suggest that the MPS reviews the adequacy of training of officers stationed in the Parliamentary Estate to ensure it includes lone actor and multi actor marauding attacks.

37. Police officers within the Parliamentary Estate are trained in tactics which relate to both lone and multi actor marauding attacks as well as knife defence. This training will be built upon at the next round of officer safety training where it will include scenario based input and will be

shared with Royalty and Specialist Protection and Aviation Policing. The training has been observed and noted by MO19. The Chief Coroner will appreciate that this is a matter which is regularly reviewed at the highest level both within the MPS and nationally.

38. The MPS constantly seeks to improve training of this kind and PaDP is currently discussing the Chief Coroner's recommendation with MO19 and the National Police Chief's Council. This will feed into MPS training forthwith.

MC10: I suggest that the MPS considers the possibility of the firearms assessor

/adviser briefing officers as to the rationale for any changes to their Post

Instructions.

39. As the Chief Coroner notes, trained tactical advisers attend challenge panels and are available to discuss post instructions and tactical planning with the PaDP Operations team.
40. The MPS notes and accepts the Chief Coroner's recommendation and will ensure that there is appropriate input from tactical advisers at challenge panels which are held bi-annually or in the event of an incident requiring such.
41. The newly appointed PaDP OFC Sergeant with responsibility for internal tactical advice will ensure that AFOs fully understand not only relevant changes to post instructions but also the rationale behind the changes. This will happen as and when post instructions change.

MC11: I suggest that the MPS considers a periodic audit of Tactical Firearms

Reviews.

42. Tactical firearms plans are constantly reviewed on at least an annual basis. The Commissioner notes the Chief Coroner's recommendation MC11 and will ensure that this continues.

Conclusion

43. As Assistant Commissioner Basu said at the conclusion of the inquests: even the possibility that the MPS lost the chance to prevent the murder of a brave and courageous officer is unacceptable. For the loss of that possibility to protect him from Khalid Masood, we are deeply sorry. On behalf of the Commissioner those comments are repeated and endorsed. It

is hoped that the Chief Coroner and PC Palmer's family will recognise from this document and our earlier response that everything possible is being done to protect both the public and police officers in the future.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Lucy D'Orsi', written in a cursive style.

Lucy D'Orsi - Deputy Assistant Commissioner